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Towards Robust and Scalable
Trust Metrics
Jeremy Avnet and Jared Saia
￿
It is an equal failing to trust everybody and to
trust nobody.
English proverb
Abstract
We describe a distributed and scalable trust metric
for networks where transactions occur under a model
of preferential attachment. Our trust metric algo-
rithm, which wecallexpert voting isverysimple. For
anetwork over
￿ nodes, the algorithm always consid-
ers only the opinions of the ﬁrst
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ nodes to join
the network; we call these nodes experts. For any
node
￿ , the algorithm evaluates the trustworthiness
of
￿ based on the opinions of those experts which
have had transactions with
￿ . Empirical results sug-
gest that this simple algorithm is surprisingly robust
for large scale networks where transactions occur un-
der a model of preferential attachment. To the best of
our knowledge, this isthe ﬁrst algorithm that exploits
a model of preferential attachment.
1 Introduction
In modern, large-scale, decentralized networks, the
issue of trust is becoming increasingly important.
Consumer-to-consumer auction sites like ebay [10],
Yahoo auctions [22], and Amazon.com auctions [3]
all provide some form of trust metric to help honest
people evaluate the degree to which they should
trust other users in the network. Even collaborative
weblog sites like Slashdot [21] provide trust metrics
to help prevent readers from being deluged by spam
from unscrupulous message posters. Unfortunately,
all of these systems rely on a single, central authority
to compute the trust metric. Such reliance creates a
single point of vulnerability which is an easy target
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for attack. In this paper, we explore the problem
of creating distributed trust metrics which avoid this
reliance on a single, central authority.
Thecontribution of this paper is three-fold. First,
we introduce a new problem formulation for trust
metrics in P2P systems, which we call the P2P
trust problem. Second, we describe a version of the
simple expert voting algorithm described in the ab-
stract which is both distributed and has good load-
balancing properties. Finally, we give empirical ev-
idence which suggests that the expert voting algo-
rithm is a robust solution to the P2P trust problem.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 1.1 we describe the P2P trust problem and
brieﬂy sketch our results on this problem. In Sec-
tion 2, we discuss related work. Section 3 describes
our algorithm and Section 4 provides empirical evi-
dence that this algorithm performs well on the P2P
trust problem. We conclude and give directions for
future work in Section 5.
1.1 Problem Formulation
To address the problem of creating a robust, scalable
and distributed trust metric, we deﬁne the P2P trust
problem. This problem formulation takes a single
input: a transaction graph. The transaction graph
has a directed edge from node
￿ to node
￿ iff node
￿ has transacted with node
￿ . Frequently, we will
refer to
￿ as the “buyer” and
￿ as the “seller” in the
transaction. The edge between
￿ and
￿ is labelled
“good” if
￿ was satisﬁed with the transaction and
“bad” otherwise. We assume that all nodes in the
system have an alignment of either “good” or “bad”.
We further assume that good nodes always truthfully
evaluate the nodes they transact with but that bad
nodes do not. More speciﬁcally, if a node
￿ is good,
then an edge from
￿ to some node
￿ will be labelled
good if
￿ is good and will be labelled bad if
￿ is
bad. If a node
￿ is bad, then an edge from
￿ to
some other node
￿ may be labelled either good or
bad independent of the alignment of
￿ . The goal
of the problem is to use the transaction graph to, as
accurately as possible, identify the alignment of the
sellers involved in future transactions.
We assume that the alignment of each node is
chosen independently to be bad with probability
￿
and good with probability
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , where
￿ is a
constant between
￿ and
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
1A major assumption of our work is that the trans-
action graph is formed under a preferential attach-
ment model of graph evolution [5, 9, 13, 12, 2]. Our
preferential attachment process is a slight variant on
that of Aiello, Chung and Lu [2]. Our process builds
a graph
￿ over
￿ discrete time steps. During time
step
￿ , the
￿ -th node, with a singe self-loop, is added
to
￿ . Additionally, a constant,
￿ (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ in our ex-
periments), number of new edges are added to
￿ .
The sources and sinks of these edges are not chosen
uniformly at random. Instead, for a given edge, the
probability ofpicking some node
￿ in
￿ asthe source
(sink) is weighted according to
￿ ’s out(in)-degree.
Several empirical studies suggest that prefer-
ential attachment models effectively capture many
properties of graphs derived from a wide-range ofso-
cial processes [5, 9, 13, 12, 2, 14, 6, 19, 11, 1].
2 Related Work
2.1 Preferential Attachment Models
A major assumption of our work is that the trans-
action graph is formed under a preferential attach-
ment model of graph evolution [5, 9, 13, 12, 2]. It
is well known that a preferential attachment model
gives rise to a power law distribution for in and out-
degrees of nodes in the graph [5, 2, 13, 12]. More-
over, the preferential attachment model is one of the
leading candidates for describing why so many so-
cial networks have power law distributions. In a
power law degree distribution, the fraction of nodes
with degree
￿ is proportional to
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ for some con-
stant
￿
￿
￿
￿ . Power law distributions have been ob-
served in a large number of social networks includ-
ing: graphs derived from the link structure of web
pages on the internet [14, 5, 6], graphs derived from
citations among academic papers [19, 11], graphs
derived from telephone calls made during a ﬁxed
time period over a given carrier’s network [1, 2], and
graphs derived from co-star relationships among a
set of actors [5]. The evolution process we use in
our experiments gives rise to power law distributions
for both in and out-degrees.
2.2 Trust Metrics
Most past work on trust metrics originates in the
cryptography community. To the best of our knowl-
edge, all previous work on trust metrics uses the
following problem formulation, which we call the
rooted trust-metric problem. There are three inputs:
the trust graph - a graph with a directed edged from
node
￿ to node
￿ iff node
￿ trusts node
￿ , the trust
root - a designated seed node in the trust graph, and
a target node. The goal is to determine the trustwor-
thiness of the target node. Typically the trust root
is assumed to be a completely trustworthy node in
the system and nodes which can be reached by short
paths from the trust root are deemed most trustwor-
thy. The edges of the trust graph frequently have la-
bels giving the degree of trustworthiness conferred
from the source of the edge to the sink.
Several algorithms have been proposed for solv-
ing the rooted trust-metric problem [20, 7, 8, 17, 18,
15]. Some of these algorithms [18, 15] have been
used in real-world systems and anecdotal evidence
on these systems suggests that the algorithms are ro-
bust to attack. In addition, Levien and Aiken [15]
have proven that their algorithm has some properties
of robustness to attack. All of these algorithms work
by computing some graph theoretic property of the
trust graph. The properties include: distance of the
target node from the trust root, number of node dis-
joint paths between the target node andtrust root, and
amount of “trust ﬂow” that can ﬂow from the trust
root to the target node.
These past algorithms, while useful for cryp-
tographic systems and smaller-scale networks, do
not seem well-suited for large-scale P2P systems for
three main reasons. First, the assumption of a trust
root elevates the importance of one node above all
others and so goes against the true democratic nature
of a peer-to-peer system. The trust root is a partic-
ularly vulnerable part of the system and would be a
likely target of attack. Second, these algorithms are
not scalable to very large networks since they all take
time which is at least linear in the number of nodes
in the trust graph. Finally, these algorithms are all
centralized since they require a single computational
entity to do the graph theoretic computation to de-
termine if the target node is trustworthy. In a P2P
system, there is typically no single computational en-
tity which knows the entire state of the network. We
believe that our proposed algorithm addresses these
three problems and so is better suited to P2Psystems.
23 The Algorithm
The expert voting algorithm in its most general form
is given as Algorithm 1. A key feature of this
algorithm is that to evaluate the trustworthiness of
a node
￿ , the algorithm considers only the opinions
that the ﬁrst
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ nodes in the network have about
￿ , and follows the majority opinion. We refer to all
nodes in the set of the ﬁrst
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ nodes in the network
as experts.
Algorithm 1 Takes as input a transaction graph
￿
over
￿ peers and a target peer
￿ . Returns “trusted” if
￿ should be trusted and “untrusted” otherwise.
1. Let
￿ be the ﬁrst
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ nodes added to
￿
2. Let
￿
￿
￿ be the set of nodes in
￿ that have edges
into
￿
3. If
￿
￿
￿ is the null set, return return “unknown”
else if the majority of peers in
￿
￿ have edges
labelled “good” into
￿ , then return “trusted”,
else return “untrusted”
3.1 Distributed Algorithm
In this section, we brieﬂy sketch a distributed version
of Algorithm 1. This new distributed algorithm
has good load-balancing properties in the sense that
trust queries are distributed across all the nodes in
the network rather than being handled solely by the
expert nodes. We make use of a distributed, robust
skip graph which can support store operations and
range queries [4]. We assume that each peer has
a unique and checkable id, and for a given peer
￿ ,
we will use
￿ to refer to both the peer and the id
of the peer. We further assume that all peers have
synchronized clocks.
When a peer
￿ joins the system at time
￿ , it stores
the record
￿ with key “join-time:
￿ ” in the skip graph.
The peers in the skip graph that store this record
verify that
￿ is in fact the correct time. Any peer
can then determine if any other peer
￿ is an expert
by doing a simple range query as follows. The range
query is for all records with keys in the range “join-
time:
￿ ” to “join-time:
￿ ” where
￿ is the start time of
the system and
￿ is the (veriﬁed) time at which
￿
entered the system.
￿ is an expert iff the number of
peers returned for this range query is no more than
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . (A distributed method for estimating
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ is
given in [16].)
Given a method for verifying whether or not a
given peer is an expert, the distributed implementa-
tion of Algorithm 1 is straightforward. For each peer
￿ in the network, we store in the skip graph, at key
“info:
￿ ”, a record on
￿ . This record contains infor-
mation on all transactions that expert peers have had
with
￿ , and the evaluation of those transactions by
the experts. The peers that maintain this record in
the skip graph ensure that 1) the record is only up-
dated by peers that are experts and 2) the record is
only updated when a transaction has occured. When
another peer wants to evaluate the trustworthiness of
peer
￿ , it need only look up this record in the skip
graph and then determine if the majority of experts
that have transacted with
￿ consider
￿ to be good.
4 Experimental Setup and Results
In this section, we describe our experiment results
on the expert voting algorithm. To describe these re-
sults, we will make use of the following deﬁnitions.
We call a node
￿ covered if there is at least one edge
in the transaction graph from an expert node into
￿ .
We call
￿ well-covered if it is covered and it’s the
case that the set of experts that have edges into
￿
contains more good experts than bad ones. We call
￿ ill-covered if it’s covered but not well-covered. Fi-
nally, for a set of nodes
￿ , we deﬁne the in-weight of
￿ to be the sum of the in-degrees of all nodes in
￿ .
Figure 1 gives our empirical results. In the top
four plots in this ﬁgure, the data points are averages
of
￿
￿
￿
￿ runs, while in the bottom two plots, the data
points are averages of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ runs. Unless otherwise
noted, in all the plots the number of edges added
to the transaction graph per time step is
￿
￿ , the
probability that a node is bad is
￿
￿
￿
￿ , and the network
size is
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ .
The top two plots show that even though the
experts tend to have edges into less than 40% of the
total nodes in the network, those nodes receive over
94% of the total in-weight present in the transaction
graph. More importantly, the middle two plots
show that the total in-weight on well-covered nodes
is around 92% and that the total in-weight on ill-
covered nodes is around 2%. These results indicate
the voting system is able to provide a useful amount
3of trustworthy advice.
The bottom two graphs show our algorithm has
a couple of robust characteristics. The bottom left
plot shows that even when a quarter of the experts
are bad, the fraction of in-weight on well-covered
nodes is over 80%. The bottom right plot shows that
each individual expert has edges into nodes that have
a signiﬁcant fraction of the total network in-weight.
Furthermore, many nodes outside of the expert set
also have edges into nodes that take a signiﬁcant
fraction of the total network in-weight. This gives
evidence that even if some of the original experts are
lost, a new expert set could possibly be made that has
a comparable ability to the original.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced the notion of the
P2P trust problem and have presented a simple, scal-
able, and distributed algorithm, called expert voting,
which addresses this problem. We have presented
empirical evidence that suggests that the expert vot-
ing algorithm is robust when we have large transac-
tion graphs created according to the preferential at-
tachment model. A major future direction is prov-
ing that expert voting is robust as
￿ grows large for
preferential-attachment style transaction graphs.
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Figure 1: These six plots describe the performance of the expert voting algorithm on a transaction graph
created by a preferential attachment model. In the top
￿ plots, the
￿ -axis gives the network size which ranges
from
￿
￿ to
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ . The
￿ -axis in the top left plot gives the fraction of nodes that are covered. The
￿ -axis in
the top right plot gives in-weight of the covered nodes divided by the total number of edges. The left middle
plot gives the in-weight of the well-covered nodes divided by the total number of edges. The right middle
plot gives the in-weight of the ill-covered nodes divided by the total number of edges. In the bottom left
plot, the
￿ -axis gives the fraction of bad experts, and the
￿ axis gives the total in-weight of the well-covered
nodes divided by the total number of edges. Finally, the
￿ -axis on the bottom right plot is an index
￿ ranging
from
￿ to
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ , and the
￿ -axis gives the in-weight of all nodes that have edges coming from the
￿ -th node
divided by the total number of edges.
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